

SURİYELİLER BAROMETRESİ

SURİYELİLERLE UYUM İÇİNDE YAŞAMIN ÇERÇEVESİ

SB
2017

M. MURAT ERDOĞAN

Savaş ve savaşla bağlı krizlerde kamuoyu genelde büyük aktörler/güçler arasındaki mücadeleye ilgi gösterir. Savaşların gerçek mağdurları yani insanlar ve toplumların yaşadıkları ise sanki tali bir konuymuş gibi algılanır. Suriye'de 2011'den bu yana devam eden yakın tarihin en büyük insanlık dramında da durum çok farklı olmadı. Oysa Suriye'deki kırılsık savaşın kuşku yok ki en büyük kaybedenleri hayatlarını, vatanlarını, geleceklerini, umutlarını kaybeden, ülkeleri harabeye döngün ve birbirlerine karşı düşmanlık hisleri ile dotan sığınakları ülkelerde "istemilmeyen" endişe edilen "duygusu ile yaşamaya, hayata tutunmaya çalışan Suriyeliler oldu. Yaşanan insanlık dramının ikinci sıradaki mağduru ise, ülkelerinden kaçmak zorunda kalanlara ev sahipliği yapmak durumunda kalan, çoğunlukla da kaynakları kısıtlı olan toplumlardır. Türkiye'nin 2011'den sonra yaşanan krizde çok özel bir yeri bulunuyor. Türkiye toplumu ile devleti ile olağanüstü bir çabayı ortaya koydu ve 6.5 milyon Suriyelinin yarısından fazlasına, yani 3.5 milyona tek başına ev sahipliği yapan ülke oldu. Türkiye'ye 2011 sonrasında çok sayıda Suriyeli olmayan sığınmacılar da geldi. Halen Türkiye'deki toplam sığınmacı sayısı 4 milyonu aştı. Yani 2011'de Türkiye'de sadece 58 bin civarında olan toplam sığınmacı sayısı 6 senede 68 kat arttı. Türkiye'de kayıt altına alınan Suriyelilerin sayısı Türkiye nüfusunun % 4.3'üne ulaştı. Halen Türkiye'deki Suriyelilerin % 94'ünden fazlası Türkiye'nin her yerine dağılım biçiminde kentsel alanlarda yaşıyor. Türkiye'de doğan Suriyeli bebek sayısı 325 bin aştı, günde ortalama 305 yeni Suriyeli bebek daha Türkiye'de dünyaya geliyor, 600 bini aşkın Suriyeli çocuk okula gidiyor, 1 milyon civarındaki Suriyeli çalışıyor. Toplumsal yaşamın bütün dinamikleri, olumsuz ve olumsuzlu ile kendini hissettiriyor. Arzu edilen, Suriye'de barış ve huzurun sağlanması ve Suriyelilerin evlerine dönmeleri olsa da, bu beklenti ile gerçeklik arasındaki "makas" kapanmıyacak kadar açılmıştır. Siyaset ne kadar plan yaparsa yapsın, konu ne kadar "geçicilik" çerçevesinde ele alınrsa alınsın, göçün fitratındaki kalıcılık, geriye dönüşü olmayacak şekilde kendini belli etmektedir. Yani, büyük bir mucize olmadıkça, Suriyelilerin çok büyük bir bölümü ile artık hep birlikte yaşayacağız. O halde olası ortak geleceğin huzur ve insan onuruna uygun biçimde nasıl sağlanacağı konusunu öncelikli olarak, süreci sağlıklı verilerle yönetmek gerekmektedir.

Prof. Dr. M. Murat Erdoğan tarafından tasarlanan ve her yıl uygulanması planlanan "Suriyeliler Barometresi", konuyu hem Türk toplumu hem de Suriyeliler bakımından ele alarak "ortak toplumsal yaşamın" dinamiklerine, uyum ve gelişim süreçlerine dikkat çekmeyi amaçlamaktadır. SB-2017 araştırması, 26 ilde 2.089 TC vatandaş (ikiği ile 3481 kamplarda, 887'si ise kamp dışında yaşayan 1.235 Suriyeli (aile) ile uygulanmıştır. Araştırmada Türk toplumunun hala yüksek oranda "kırılgan" ve hatta "kerhen" toplumsal desteğini ortaya koymaktadır. Türk toplumu Suriyelilere destek olmakla, geleceği paylaşmak konusunda ciddi bir ayırım gözetmiyor. Suriyeliler ise Türkiye'de hayata tutunmaya ve geleceklerini Türkiye'de kurmaya çaba gösteriyor. Prof. Erdoğan, bu çalışmanın, 2011'den bu yana yaşanan süreci anlamaya, tanımlamaya ve ardından da insan onurunun gözetildiği, hak temelli, huzurlu (ve muhtemelen) "ortak" bir geleceğin altyapısı için akademiye ve politika yapıcılara sağlıklı veri sağlamayı hedeflediğini ifade etmektedir.



KAPAK FOTOĞAFI:
HALEP'TEN KAÇAN SURİYELİ BİR AİLE,
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ARAŞTIRMA

M. Murat Erdoğan

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SYRIANS BAROMETER-2017 REPORT IS PUBLISHED IN MARCH 2018 AS A BOOK IN TURKISH BY İSTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING

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SYRIANS-BAROMETER-2017 SB-2017

"A FRAMEWORK FOR ACHIEVING SOCIAL COHESION WITH SYRIANS IN TURKEY"

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Prof. Dr. M. Murat ERDOĞAN

6.12.2017




EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The upheaval and civil uprisings in Syria which started in 2011, escalated into a civil war involving numerous actors in short time, thereby leading to one of the severest humanitarian crises the history has ever witnessed. As of the end of 2017 the crisis is still continuous, and unlikely to come to an end in short and medium terms; and even after the end of the war, its impact will be felt deeply across the country. No wonder the Syrians are whom has lost the most due to the conflict. Unfortunately, everything has changed for the Syrians who lost their lives, their homelands and their future, to the extent that it cannot be reverted back to 2011 anymore. The neighboring countries, particularly Turkey which has 911 kilometers long border with Syria, are the second most affected from the conflict situation, or, so to speak, the victims of it. Involving a group of 252 people, the first mass movement from Syria to Turkey took place on 29 April 2011, subsequently followed by growing number refugees fleeing Syria over the course.

In line with the norms enshrined in the international law and the universal principles of human rights, Turkey's approach to the crisis, which envisaged that its borders would be kept open for those who escape the war and persecution, that their basic needs would be met, and that no person would be forcefully returned back to their home country, was maintained and applied until 2016, albeit some exceptional restrictions. This asylum-friendly policy dramatically increased the number of asylum-seekers¹ in Turkey. By the end of 2011 (or in 2012), number of Syrians in Turkey reached 14.237; by 2013 to 224.665; by 2014 up to 1.519.286; by 2015 to 2.503.549; and by 2016 to 2.834.441. Despite some decrease in these numbers due to secondary refugee movements, as of 9 November 2017 the Syrians who are registered under the temporary protection of the Turkish government has reached 3.303.113. Only in 2017, 468.672 Syrians entered Turkey for asylum purposes. The registration and temporary protection processes continue with intensity. Recently registrations are carried for newborn babies and those have been previously not registered due to various reasons, and around 1250-1500 new registrations take place on daily basis. Meanwhile, verification of the previous registrations are being conducted through the collaboration of the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). After the verification and new registrations are completed, number of refugees is estimated to be between 3 and 3,5 million.

¹In this study, we have deliberately used "Syrians", "asylum-seekers" and "Syrian refugees" interchangeably based on the sociological context and common daily use regardless of the respective terms' legal meaning and relevance in Turkish legal system.

In addition to the Syrians, nationals of other countries, mainly Iraqis and Afghans, entered Turkey for asylum purposes in serious numbers. As of November 2017 number of non-Syrian refugees² in Turkey has reached 462.000. In addition to that figure, 586.596 foreigners have residence permit. Before the first arrival of Syrians in April 2011, number of the “international protection claimant” status-holders was only 58.018. Only the Syrians comprise the 4% of the total population of Turkey, whereas when non-Syrians are added, the value increases 3.7 million refugees by 4.5%. This reflects the most serious humanitarian crisis and population movement Turkey has ever encountered.



The number and period of stay of the Syrian refugees has exceeded all the initial estimates in Turkey. Moreover, it long transcended being a matter concerning merely the border provinces, but rather has become a matter of Turkey in general. Particularly after 2014, Syrians commence to settle all across the country totally of their own accord, in spite of the fact that

² Press release following the Migration Policy Board’s convention on 18 November 2017 (DGMM: http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/goc-politikalari-kurulu-toplandi_350_359_11473_icerik).

they were under obligation to reside in their provinces of registration. The number of Syrians in Turkey has reached the population size of a medium size European country and continues to increase by natural means. As of November 2017, number of Syrian births has exceeded 295.000, with 306 new births per day. Thus, the permanence of Syrians in Turkey and inevitability of social coherence are growingly becoming matters require urgent attention.

SB-2017 / Executive Summary / Prof. Dr. M. Murat Erdoğan

“Syrian Barometer: The Framework of Social Coherence with Syrians” (SB-2017)

SB-2017 is designed as a comprehensive and continuous study which assesses its subject matter from the perspective of both the Turkish society and the Syrians with an aim to academically define the content and framework of social coherence with Syrians, which has been widely recognized as a matter of inevitability in sight of the number of Syrians which reached 3.303.113 under the temporary protection of the Turkish government, and the fact that their average duration of stay in Turkey exceeds 3.5 years. SB-2017 is the most comprehensive study the findings of which is open to public. The study is conducted in 26 provinces with 2089 Turkish citizens on individual basis; and in 11 provinces with 1235 Syrian families on household basis, of which 348 families from the camps and 887 from urban settings, through 3324 surveys, reaching out and exploring the opinions of 2.089 Turkish citizens and 7591 Syrians. Lack of sound information on the topic and restrictions of access to present information often leads to shortfalls in capturing and assessing the reality. Therefore, we put meticulous effort to design and apply the SB-2017 research with an aim to meet the academic standards, and to the best extent tried to confirm our findings with the present data. However, it should be taken into the account that that the process is exceptionally dynamic and susceptible to constant changes. Despite all the academic precision from our side, this study does not claim to reflect the “reality as a whole”.

The main priority of SB-2017 is to provide sound information and a comprehensive picture of a subject which suffers serious lack of data. An experienced research team which conducted field researches since the first refugee movements has evaluated the findings in light of the national and international data. The preceding to SB-2017, another study named “Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration” was conducted by M.M. Erdoğan and his team on behalf of Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center-HUGO. SB-2017 maps the differences during the last three years and makes it possible to compare and report some data between the two studies. Syrian Barometer (SB) research is designed not to be only a single study, but one to be repeated annually with the same model and the same survey items with an aim to come up with a process observation study being publicized in December every year. Thus, the Syrian Barometer research aims to contribute to the policy making processes and make policy suggestions through scholarly observations and assessments.

TABLE-5: Research Sample: 3.324 Survey

The number of people reached: 2.089 Turkish citizens + 7.591 Syrians = 9.680

Turkish society (Turkish citizen): 2.089 / 26 Provinces

İller							
Sıra No.		#	%	Sıra No.		#	%
1	İstanbul	347	16,7	14	Trabzon	70	3,4
2	Ankara	121	5,8	15	Konya	67	3,2
3	Adana	107	5,1	16	Kayseri	66	3,2
4	İzmir	99	4,7	17	Mardin	55	2,6
5	Bursa	98	4,7	18	Van	54	2,6
6	Kocaeli	90	4,3	19	Tekirdağ	52	2,5
7	Şanlıurfa	90	4,3	20	Kırıkkale	51	2,4
8	Manisa	84	4,0	21	Balıkesir	44	2,1
9	Hatay	82	3,9	22	Kastamonu	42	2,0
10	Samsun	79	3,8	23	Zonguldak	42	2,0
11	Antalya	77	3,7	24	Ağrı	40	1,9
12	Aydın	77	3,7	25	Malatya	40	1,9
13	Gaziantep	76	3,6	26	Erzurum	39	1,9
Toplam						2089	100,0

Syrians (Outside Camps): 887 / 10 Provinces

İller		
	#	%
İstanbul	170	19,2
Hatay	155	17,5
Şanlıurfa	125	14,1
Gaziantep	120	13,5
Adana	82	9,2
Mersin	66	7,4
İzmir	52	5,9
Kilis	41	4,6
Bursa	41	4,6
Mardin	35	4,0
Toplam	887	100,0

OUTSIDE CAMPS: 887 (%72)


Syrians (In Camps): 348 / 6 Provinces

İller			
Sıra No.		#	%
1	Şanlıurfa	136	39,1
2	Mardin	68	19,5
3	Gaziantep	43	12,4
4	Hatay	38	10,9
5	Kilis	36	10,3
6	Adana	27	7,8
Toplam		348	100,0

IN CAMPS: 348 (%28)

NUMBER OF SYRIANS HOUSEHOLDS: 1.235 (PERSONS WHOSE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED: 7.591)

As envisaged since 2014 by the team which conducted it, SB-2017 research takes its point of departure as the idea that the Syrians in Turkey is not to be regarded as a matter of temporariness but rather of permanence. In that connection the study aims to render its findings into policy suggestions, and thus contribute to integration policies. We discern that that, in sight of more than 3.7 million refugees and asylum-seekers comprising 4.5% of total population in Turkey, the policies which are based on their temporariness and approaches which focus on saving the day may pose greater risk in future, as opposed to a comprehensive and strategic migration management.



TEMPORARIES: The Syrians in Turkey is a matter which should not be regarded as a temporary burden to bear, but rather as a dynamic process which has multifaceted impacts on the Turkish society and should be managed prudently. Otherwise, Turkey will have to face greater consequences posed by the risk of deepening its internal problems, more polarized social cleavages, and collapse of fragile and reluctant social acceptance, solidarity and sacrifice shown by Turkish society for Syrians, paving the way of hatred and racism.

The main purpose of the Syrian Barometer is to offer scholarly suggestions to find ways to build a future of peace, compatible with human dignity, for a Turkey in which Syrians will inevitably take part. Within the constraints of an academic effort, this study aims to shed light on the different dimensions of the subject through its findings, and then make its contribution through making rights-based, individual-based policy suggestions for a Turkey which is characterized by consensus and participation, as opposed to that of conflict.

STRATEGIC DECISION: In spite of the fact that Turkey had a Syria policy for 6.5 years, barely can it be said that it has a comprehensive policy for the Syrians (or refugees, asylum-seekers). Nevertheless, extraordinary efforts devoted by the Turkish society, the public institutions, NGOs since 29 April 2011 are beyond commendable. Having said that, we are in phase in which policies are based on the idea of temporariness and, thus, naturally of short-term. Such policies might have proved useful for the first couple of years, however their limits have long been exceeded. Even though integration policies entail the risk of promoting permanence, more risks are to be taken by running a process which is led by temporariness and emergency management. Owing to the perception of temporariness, time, resources, labor and generations are being lost. Unless realistic, comprehensive, medium and long-term strategies

are developed in a short while, it is not hard to envisage that the social peace will be shattered. Thus, the risk is higher by the avoidance of integration policies, than the risk of integration policies itself.

The Turkish government runs the risk of not developing a comprehensive migration strategy, however this is not to undermine the successful performance and efforts of Turkey for refugees. The efforts of the public institutions and bureaucrats played an important role to keep the problems at minimum up to this point. As we can see clearly in last 5-6 years, the most developed countries dodged the burden and employed policies which externalize the problem. In line with the imbalanced rate of 15%-85% in accepting refugees, only 15% of the Syrian refugees had their way to developed countries. Even such result was prone to great tragedies such as that of baby Aylan, whose dead body was found on the Aegean shores of Turkey. As opposed to that, Turkey has displayed a commendable courage and sacrifice to accept refugees and managed the crisis successfully up to the day, despite limited resources and even more limited foreign aid. No wonder, the hesitation of Turkish state about whether to move forward with the policies of temporariness stems from the acute uncertainty pertaining to the crisis in Syria. However, the phases after this should not be built upon the level of certainty in Syria, but rather by taking into the account -almost certain- tendency of permanence of Syrians in Turkey.

The number of whom has been ever increasing in each and every update since 2011, the Syrians in Turkey are spread across all of the country and commenced their new lives. That is to say that they surely did not wait for politics and sociology to resolve the issues before establishing their own reality. In that regard, the Turkish society did something very exceptional and has achieved hosting millions of refugees and asylum-seekers for last 6.5 years. As demonstrated by the sections of this study, Syrians feel safe and even happy in Turkey, which is responded by the Turkish society with a high-level of social acceptance albeit with serious concerns about future. Drawing a reliable picture of the situation and reaching right conclusions are prerequisite to maintain this social acceptance which is already characterized by reluctance and fragility.


CITY REFUGEES INSTEAD OF CAMPS: In 2017, every new day witnessed the birth of 306 Syrian babies in Turkey. However, there are not only births but also deaths, with some 10 thousand Syrians having passed away in the last 6 years during their stay in Turkey. Some of them were buried in Turkey, others were buried in Syria.

CITIZENSHIP: Since 2017, there is a new policy concerning the naturalization of Syrians with “high qualifications” and with contributions to Turkey. However, three major problems emerged in this regard.

1. The difficulties in finding “high quality” persons among the Syrians; therefore, only some 12 thousand individuals were identified, around 50 thousand including their close family members.
2. The rather uncommitted attitude of these Syrians, as they either do not want to lose their current advantages in Turkey or plan to relocate to a third country, thus making a Turkish naturalization process less interesting
3. Huge objections from within the Turkish society.

Based on all these reasons, as of November 2017, there are only 38 thousands Syrians who have been naturalized as Turkish citizens. It seems likely that there would be further moves to this direction. Nevertheless, our assumption is that, mostly due to high social reactions and objections, this will not be a policy of mass naturalization, but rather run on more exceptional measures.

EDUCATION: Among more than 1.010.000 Syrian children in school age in Turkey, 612 thousand were enrolled in schools in 2017-2018 semesters. Despite these extraordinary numbers, the education aspect remains to be problematic both for those have and have not access to education. In terms of the situation in Temporary Education Centers (TECs), there are multitude of problems including medium of education, quality of training and trainers, and also the attendance of children enrolled. In addition, for those who are enrolled in public schools receiving Turkish-medium education, the children face problems in adaptation and performance. Another problem is the dropouts after the first and second grades, leading to a sharp decrease in participation to education in long term. Dropouts are also common among the children who are transferred from TECs to public schools. Apart from these widespread problems in education, there are many children whose education is



permanently disrupted after their arrival to Turkey. As of the end of 2017, more than 400.000 Syrian children in school age are not enrolled in schools. If the children who did not continue their education in the previous years, yet could not be shown in statistics anymore since they


are no longer minors are added to this figure, an estimated number of 700-800 thousand children has joined to “the lost generations”. There is a widespread consensus on the solution that Syrian children should be integrated into Turkish education system, as Turkish Ministry of Education plans to close TECs altogether. However, realistically the numbers cannot be reduced that easily, and it runs the risk of damaging the balance of education system in Turkey. The main requirement is not only the enrollment of children in schools but also ensuring their attendance, whereas this is already known to be a problematic issue. If we calculate on the basis of 20 students per teacher, at least 50.000 new teachers are needed. Only 50.000 teachers’ annual salary amounts to more than 600 million €. These teachers should also receive special formation to teach for Syrian children. If the annual average cost of per children to Turkish economy is estimated 1000 €, an additional 1 billion € fund is required to that end. For the Syrian children, 1189 schools with at least 24 size classrooms will be necessary. Despite all these needs, planned number of schools, which is largely funded by the EU and foreign aid, meets only 10% of the total requirement. This outcome raises concerns about future, and will have potentially negative impact on the prospects of integration.

SYRIAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS: In 2016-2017 semesters, there were 14.740 Syrian students enrolled in universities in Turkey, half of which were transferred from Syrian universities and the other half completed high schools in Turkey and took university examinations. In 2017-2018 semesters this number increased to 19.650 in 140 different public and private universities across the country. Particularly during a phase in which qualified Syrians are leaving Turkey, these figures are still of importance. However the Syrians receiving higher education has become quite controversial among the Turkish society, mainly because of shortfalls in communication strategies. Respective institutions should address this problem by informing the public to eliminate misunderstandings, and at the same time should create employment opportunities to keep the educated people in Turkey on their own accord. The picture is extraordinarily negative in terms of the level of education and qualifications of the Syrians with whom the Turkish society will share a mutual future. The most optimistic figures indicate that around 30% of the Syrians did not receive any education at all. Therefore, as main element to the integration policies, the means should be devised to attract qualified Syrian youth and keep them in Turkey.

LABOR WORLD: The right to work of Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey has been regulated in January 2016. However, there has not been sufficient progress in the two years following this regulation with regard to the use of these rights. There are only around 10 thousand Syrians (with the status of temporary protection) who have joined the work force by gaining their work permits. This is so notwithstanding the fact that especially Syrians living in urban areas have not many other options except working in order to sustain their lives. The assumptions point to a figure of 800 thousand to 1 million Syrians who are in fact part of the work force. The biggest problem in this regard is their working as unregistered persons.

Among the biggest reasons of this lie the high unemployment figures in Turkey and the fact that around some 35% of Turkish work force itself is unregistered, forming an informal part of Turkish economy. Syrians have not generated a substantial competition for local population until now, not causing thereby high job losses for Turks. This is so due to their very low wages, coupled with the very difficult working conditions and lack of prestige in the areas of their work. It has become a rather accepted fact that Syrians participate in the Turkish economy, even if informally, with governmental officials declaring this as a major source for the economy. However, it is clear that such a broad informal and unregistered work force and the concomitant exploitation of their labor is unsustainable. Interestingly enough, the real tensions within the Turkish society pertain not to the fact of Syrians work force but rather to their establishing of new businesses.

POLITICAL EFFECT: The subject of Syrians in Turkey is first and foremost a matter of humanitarian nature, whereas Turkey's Syria policy preferences adds a political dimension to the matter, which leads to differences in approach between those who support the government and the opposition parties. In contrast to highly-politicized nature of the topic even in countries where there are only 10.000 Syrian refugees, the topics relating to the Syrians in Turkey have not been regarded by Turkish political parties as a matter of internal politics or an instrument for daily political debates in past three elections, except for some marginal and situational cases. This can be attributable to the resilience of Turkish society on the topic which should be appreciated. The disinterest of Turkish media can actually be "fortunate" for Syrians. However, now this is changing as well, and the matter is gradually becoming a matter of debate. The situation in the foreign policy, however, is completely different as the Syrians in Turkey have become an instrument which is often used in Turkey's bilateral relations with the EU, and has been among the top priority matters. Having been entitled to the role of keeping refugees who have been suffering from lack of international solidarity inside its territory, Turkey is by every means right on the issue. The typical scene of global burden-sharing was repeated in the Syrian crisis, as only the neighboring countries shouldered the most of the burden, that is, not only financial, but also political, social, and security-wise. "3RP" (Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan) of the United Nations, which was designed as a comprehensive program to assist and increase the resilience of the countries of asylum, has not been sufficiently effective mainly because of the lack of contribution from the donor countries and institutions. Only 37% of the 890 million \$ which was assigned for Turkey has been funded in the scope of the program. No wonder, if there is a failure here, it is only that of the international community which growingly follows a protectionist and security-oriented trend.



COST: Economically developed countries not only externalized the problem by concentrating on fortifying their borders, but also have been very reluctant to financially assist the neighbors of Syria which became victims of their open-doors policy. This is very well-indicated by the fact that among the 28 EU countries which are in one of the most prosperous zones of the globe, only two have more than 100.000 Syrians, followed by seven countries which have between 10,000 and 70.000, and the rest 19 countries have 43.795 Syrians in total; while at least 10 cities in Turkey has more than 100.000 Syrians. If the number of Syrians in the EU were to be distributed among the member states, there would be 2.305 Syrians per country. This is utterly an unjust and unsustainable scene. The refugee deal between the EU and Turkey is a product of the same mindset which effectively externalized the problem in exchange of providing financial aid. The “success” here is more on the EU part, whereas obviously not so much for

Turkey and other neighbors of Syria. More significantly, Syrian issue led to an axis shift in the EU-Turkey relations from strategic and psychological aspects, and consolidated the anti-EU and anti-Western sentiments in Turkey. There are many problems in the deal between Turkey and the EU. First is about the logic and scope of the agreement between the 3 losers (Turkey, the EU, and Refugees). The EU expects Turkey to impose stricter border controls and end the flow of refugees with an aim to clearly externalize the problem. In essence the deal was devised as a readmission agreement to prevent the non-Syrians from seeking asylum in the EU territories, whereas it has developed a very unique and controversial system for Syrians. According to that, any Syrian who enters EU from Turkey through irregular means was to be returned to Turkey, and instead another Syrian was to be resettled to EU through regular channels (1-1 deal); and Turkey will accept non-Syrian returnees without objection. In exchange, the EU will provide Turkey with financial assistance of 3 billion € for the next two years and another 3 billion for the following two years which makes 6 billion € in total. Moreover, consensus was reached on lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens and opening new chapters for Turkish accession negotiations to the EU. After 1.5 years passed, only 60% of this financial assistance were utilized in Turkey, whereas the rest is pending in planning and application phase. A study in Germany indicated that even if the technical difficulties would have been overcome, and 6 billion € would have been provided to Turkey right away, this would be such a small contribution. The findings of the study which was conducted in the University of Cologne reveals that the annual cost of per refugee in Germany is 15.000 €, that is, 1.250 € per month, and 41 € per day³. In that case 507.000 Syrian refugees in Germany cost 7.6 billion € to the German economy. Hypothetically drawing on these figures, if 3.2 million Syrians were in Germany, the annual cost would increase to 48.7 billion €. If the refugees have been in Germany instead of Turkey between 2011-2017, the cost for 6.5 years would be 152 billion €. In light of these figures, the deal between Turkey and the EU envisaging only 3+3 billion € is striking. Unfortunately, the cost accounts declared by Turkey are only mass figures without detail, which does not help determining the content of costs, and thus not entirely credible. Drawing on the estimation that a refugee costs Germany 41 € per day would only cost Turkey 10 € per day, Turkey has spent approximately 35 billion € for Syrian refugees over 6.5 years.

³ Deutsche Welle (1.2.2016): "Tax money to the tune of 50 billion euros is needed to shelter, feed and train the refugees in Germany in 2016 and 2017, says a new study by the Cologne Institute for Economic Research (IW). The study was financed by companies and business associations. Housing, food and welfare would cost 12,000 euros per refugee per year, the researchers assume. They add 3,300 euros annually per refugee for language and integration classes, resulting in a total of 15,000 euros per person and year." Andreas Becker, "The Costs of The Refugee Crisis", DW, February 1, 2016, <http://www.dw.com/en/the-costs-of-the-refugee-crisis/a-19016394> (accessed Jan 10, 2017)

BURDEN-SHARING: No wonder, the imbalance in financial burden-sharing is disturbing, yet even if the costs incurred could have been met by some means, the other risks which Turkey runs are of rather more importance. For instance, social, economic and particularly the security risks often cause more unease. In that regard, the EU-Turkey deal should be revised since its priority is not to support the neighboring countries which suffer more from the crisis but to protect the EU from the refugees. It should be emphasised that widely held perception on the EU side concerning the success of the deal by itself is not realistic. The refugee movement from Syria had been already slowed down due to other factors such as the shifting power balance in Syria after the Russian intervention in support of the Syrian regime, Turkey's closure of its Syrian borders due to threats to its security and new population policies in the region. Another important factor is the closure of the Balkan route in a manner reminding the "push back" phenomenon. In which case, slowing down of the refugee influx is not a surprising consequence.

There arise debates from time to time about the money spent by Turkey's for Syrians and other refugees since 2011. The basic problem concerns the insufficient distinction made between direct expenditure and indirect costs. Another very significant issue is the lack of transparency. This creates the further problem of making the credibility of Turkey's costs claims questionable. Although the Turkish state does not provide direct financial support for refugees, the total sum of costs is assumed indeed to be even higher than stated. For example, considering that a single refugee presents a 41 Euro per day cost for Germany and only 10 Euro per day in Turkey, it leads us to assume that Turkey has spent at least 50 billion Euros since 2011. The latest statement by Turkey, on the other hand, mentions that "Turkey has spent 2.3 billion US dollars in the form of AFAD money, 6 billion US dollars in the form of local-city authorities and 1.2 billion US dollars through NGOs." The remaining costs are not direct, but concern indirect costs. Turkey needs to clearly emphasize this point, and to simultaneously to declare that certain costs, as in the case of SUY, are met by other funds. This would make its case more credible and reasonable.

OPEN DOOR POLICY IN CRISES: Alongside the Syrian crisis, obviously the international refugee law itself is in crisis as the numbers went well beyond any imagination, asylum-seeker influx grew exponentially, and some basic principles are left devoid of any real meaning. The global public should re-evaluate the essential principles of international refugee law such as open-doors policy and non-refoulement. At the time when the crisis broke out in Syria, many European institutions put pressure on the neighboring countries to implement an open-doors policy. No wonder at the hour of such humanitarian catastrophe it is expected of all actors to exercise conscience and honor the principles enshrined in international law. There is a debate about what course of action should be taken when the threat of war and death continues and incoming asylum-seekers are unable to return after all neighboring countries open their

borders, as it have been in the Syrian case. The practices in the refugee situations across the globe indicate that more than 75% of the refugees are present in the countries neighboring their home country. Ideally, if there is no prospect of return, these refugees should be reasonably distributed within the international community. It is indeed quite legitimate to ask *why neighboring countries should agree to be the victims of a crisis for which they had no responsibility and if a Syrian national who fled to Turkey or Lebanon has no prospects of return to Syria, what is the real difference between him/her being in Turkey, Lebanon or France, Canada, Switzerland.* These cannot be elucidated by the obligations arising from the readmission agreements *per se*. The answers to these questions are plain and simple, whereas the protectionist and security-oriented policies blur the causes for a fair burden-sharing. The avoidance of burden and responsibility sharing paves the way to more serious humanitarian crises, as in the context of an upcoming humanitarian crisis and ensuing refugee situation, the neighboring countries may strictly close their borders, having known that they would not receive international support, those who come would always stay and pose problems to address.

We need to recognize the fact that integration policies lead to unease especially in the neighboring countries since they may put unwanted incentives towards permanence. Even language training which is often regarded as the most basic and “innocent” step of an integration policy may promote permanence. Unbalanced burden and responsibility sharing across the globe and the developed/prosperous countries’ efforts to externalize the problem constitute psychological impediments to integration policies and governments of the recipient countries tend to resist them. External financial aid to promote integration may be regarded by the recipient country as being pushed the burden off on it. These concerns may validly be raised in the context of the recent crisis, as the burden of refugees has become a matter of exchange, and in exchange of financial aid if need be, as a strategy to dodge responsibility, and to externalize and push off the problem. However such concerns also delay the integration policies and lead to multiplication of the problems. Yet another issue is that, in the countries where Syrians sought asylum in massive numbers such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, the governments deliberately avoid strategically developing their own intergration policies, since they fear to promote permanence and the belief that the Syrians will someday return their home is an instrument to appease the society. However, when the countries do not develop their own strategy and projects, any “external” suggestion and even assistance is met with doubt. This has often been the case for Turkey in the recent years. The space for collaboration shrinks when the security aspect of the subject is added with the doubt about the activities of international institutions, including the UN, and INGOs. In this regard, international institutions should dedicate more effort to establish mutual trust with the governmental institutions in Turkey and engage more in collaborative projects. Having been largely derived from the past contexts of humanitarian crises characterized by collapsed

systems and dysfunctional governments, the operational patterns of the international institutions and INGOs prove ineffective in their comprehension of Turkey, and impede their ability to cooperate effectively. Another point to highlight is that the resources allotted for Turkey is at very symbolic level, which, in turn, leads Turkish authorities to distance themselves from the international institutions, and mostly, from the INGOs; while there is a dire need to develop cooperation between Turkish and international institutions based on reasonable premises. Due to the concerns for security, restrictions could be imposed on the activities of unaccredited or underperforming institutions and organizations, however obviously number of which would have been at minimum. For the rest of them, it is of vital importance to permit their the activities and operations with an aim to attract more resources and promote capacity-building in Turkey. We should not miss that not only the financial resources but also the merits of capacity-building will contribute substantially throughout the whole process.

SB-2017 Research Findings

SB-2017 study is the outcome of an effort to build up the most realistic picture of the actual situation for the Turkish society and Syrians in Turkey with an aim to contribute to the mutual peaceful future. This study is one of the most comprehensive studies on its subject matter with highest degree of representative value, yet it does not claim that its findings should be regarded as “the absolute truth” or they thus reflect the confirmed opinions of the Turkish society and the Syrians. In social sciences, each finding yielded through the use of different methodologies is able to capture only a limited portion of the reality, which is indeed a fact to bear in mind when the comments and analyses in this study are considered.

SB-2017 Turkish Society

	Number #	%		Number #	%
Gender			Ethnic Origin		
Female	1029	49,3	Turkish	1710	81,9
Male	1060	50,7	Kurd/Zaza	283	13,5
Age			Arab	48	2,3
18-24	395	18,9	Other	12	0,6
25-34	563	27,0	No answer	36	1,7
35-44	496	23,7	Sect		
45-54	374	17,9	Sunni	1824	87,3
55-64	170	8,1	Alawi	82	3,9
Above 65	91	4,4	Other	3	0,1
Education Level			No idea/No answer	180	8,7
Illiterate	19	0,9	Political Party (to whom you voted in the last elections?)		
literate	23	1,1	AK Party	833	39,9
Primary school	493	23,6	CHP	359	17,2
Secondary school/elementary education	384	18,4	MHP	220	10,5
High school or equivalent school	759	36,3	HDP	90	4,3
University/grad student	411	19,7	other	16	0,8
Working condition			I did not vote	239	11,4

Artisan	519	24,9	No answer	332	15,9
Private sector employee	502	24,0			
Housewife	423	20,2			
Retired	190	9,1			
Student	169	8,1			
Public sector employee	141	6,7			
Unemployed	68	3,3			
Businessman (who has one employee or more)	34	1,6			
Casual worker	27	1,3			
Other	15	0,7			
No answer	1	0,1			

In SB-2017 study, the field research conducted with Turkish citizens presented following key findings:

- The Turkish society still displays a high level of social acceptance, albeit fragile, even after 6.5 years passed and size of the Syrian population exceeded 3.3 million. This “reluctant” acceptance takes place simultaneously with the fact that the Turkish society is anxious and deeply pessimistic about Syrians.
- Despite being shared partially due to political considerations, the Turkish society’s concerns about coexistence with the Syrians do not escalate into reactionary behavior except for very exceptional circumstances.
- Turkish society first and foremost defines Syrians as “vulnerable people who escaped from violence/war”. However subsequent descriptions (the people who are a burden on us; dangerous people who will pose problems in our future; beggars/ the people who merely depend on others’ assistance; people who are very different from and foreign to us) demonstrate the concerns and otherization.

The most appropriate statements to describe Syrian asylum seekers (multiply answer)			
Order No.		#	%
1	Victims who escaped from war and persecution	1208	57,8
2	They are people putting burden on us	899	43,0
3	They are dangerous people who will lead us to troubles in the future	814	39,0
4	Beggars/who live only with help	509	24,4
5	Our brothers in religion	433	20,7
6	Guests in our country	424	20,3
7	They are quite different and foreigners	376	18,0
8	Harmless people who live their own lives	306	14,6
9	People who are abused in labor force	298	14,3
10	Other	15	0,7
	No idea/no answer	32	1,5

- It is remarkable that the Turkish people define Syrians very rarely as “one of ourselves” and “brothers/sisters in religion”. As such, the society displays very limited appeal to the “myth of solidarity” and sentimentalization symbolized by the Islamic “ansar” discourse of the Turkish politicians.
- As per the observations, the most serious emotional reaction of the Turkish society about the Syrians is that the former socially distances itself from the latter. The attributes ascribed to the Syrians and desire for current and potential social communication is very limited.
- Among the positive attributes such as “diligent”, “good”, “approachable”, “polite”, “reliable” which were offered as options to Turkish people for describing Syrians, the highest point given was 39.2%; whereas the “negative” attributes ranged between 51.6% and 54.9%. Despite such an approach, it can be said that the society has exercised some level of moderation in the negative responses, thereby providing room for progress either towards positive or negative directions. Although otherization towards Syrians appears to be a common trend in the Turkish society, prevalence of such trend is much higher among the voters of MHP (Nationalist Movement Party).

TABLE-12: How much the following is suitable for Syrian asylum seekers in our country?		
Order No.		Points
1	Lazy	54,9
2	Keeping distance	53,3
3	Bad	53,3
4	Rude	53,2
5	Dowdy/filthy	52,7
6	Untrustable/dangerous	51,6
7	Hard working	39,2
8	good	38,2
9	Friendly	37,7
10	Polite	34,6
11	Trust worthy	33,8
12	Clean	33,5
Average points		44,7

- The study in 2014, which was a precedent to SB-2017, revealed a surprising finding about the “perception of cultural differentiation” which has been recurrent finding in SB-2017 in a more salient manner. The Turkish people who were asked how much the Syrians culturally resemble them responded “they do not resemble at all” by 40.8%, “they do not resemble” by 39.4%. The sum of “they resemble” and “they resemble a lot” is 7.8%. In other words, 80% of the Turkish society could not find affinity between themselves and the Syrians. An interesting finding about the “we do not resemble” responses is that in the regions bordering Syria, where people share the same geography, religion, sect and even ethnic commonality with Syrians, the level of otherization is higher than the country average which is 82.7%. Despite very limited support for the “we resemble” proposition, the strongest support is demonstrated by 12.2% by the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), followed by ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Parti) with 10.7%. No wonder this seems to be a matter of perception which may or may not coincide with the reality about resemblance between two societies. However, such a result rather indicates a very clear reaction by the Turkish society.

TABLE-14: How do you think Syrians in Turkey are similar to us in terms of culture?

	#	%	%
Not similar at all	853	40,8	80,2
Not similar	823	39,4	
Not similar and similar at the same time	185	8,9	8,9
Similar	152	7,3	7,8
Quite similar	10	0,5	
No idea/no answer	66	3,1	
Total	2089	100,0	

TABLE-15: How do you think the Syrians in Turkey are similar to us in terms of culture?? (%)

	Not similar at all	Not similar	Not similar and similar at the same time	similar	Quite similar	No idea/ no answer
Education level						
illiterate	57,9	26,3	10,5	5,3	-	-
literate	39,1	30,4	17,4	8,7	-	4,4
Primary school	44,0	37,9	6,1	7,9	0,6	3,5
Secondary school/elementary education	40,1	41,4	8,6	6,3	0,3	3,3
High school or equivalent school	39,9	40,7	8,8	7,2	0,3	3,1
University/grad student	38,7	38,0	11,9	7,5	1,0	2,9
Regions						
Border provinces	49,0	33,7	7,8	8,0	0,2	1,3
Other provinces	38,8	40,8	9,1	7,1	0,5	3,7
Political party						
AK Parti	38,9	34,8	11,8	10,2	0,5	3,8
CHP	43,2	45,7	7,5	1,9	-	1,7
MHP	44,5	39,5	5,9	4,1	-	6,0
HDP	47,8	33,3	4,4	11,1	1,1	2,3
General	40,8	39,4	8,9	7,3	0,5	3,1

- The Syrian population more than 3.2 million in size are spread all across the country, which makes it virtually inevitable for Turkish society to interact with the Syrians. Stronger is the means of coexistence with Syrians, the more is the interaction between two societies. However, such interaction does not necessarily represent coherence in favorable terms, but may as well lead towards the direction of “tension”. It is striking to see that in the Turkish provinces neighboring Syria, those who report the occurrence of conflict and problem is 17.3% as opposed to other provinces which reported around %9. This may be accounted for the density of the Syrian population in the region, yet it should be emphasized that physical closeness does not always translated into emotional affinity. Actually it may even be a factor leading to increasing otherization and conflict.

Social Distance Scales				Social Distance Scales			
Syrians				Turkish Society			
Social Distance Groups				Social Distance Groups			
	#	%	Social Distance point		#	%	Social Distance Point
Very distant	14	1,1	-0,86	Very distant	74	36,1	-0,95
Distant	53	4,3	-0,18	Distant	55	26,8	-0,51
Neither distant nor close	28	22,9	0,16	Neither distant nor close	36	17,5	-0,02
Close	49	40,2	0,53	Close	22	10,6	0,44
Very close	38	31,5	0,91	Very close	18	9,0	0,88
General	12	10	0,52	general	20	10	-0,36
	32	0,0			72	0,0	

-1.0 : -0.60	-0.59 : -0.10	-0.09: 0.39	0.40 : 0.79	0.80 : 1.0
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- The framework for coexistence and processes of integration are the key topics on which the SB-2017 focuses. In that regard, social distance is an essential factor to shed light on. Through the studies employing Cluster and Discriminant analyses, Turkish citizens responded their social distance on a scale in percentage as follows: 36.1% opted for “very distant”, 26.8% for “distant”, %17.5 for “neither distant, nor close”, 10.6% for “close” and %9 for “very close”. In other words, 62.9% of the Turkish society feel that they are either “very distant” or “distant” to the Syrians,

whereas %19.6 feel “close” or “very close”. These results corroborate with the findings about “resemblance” above. Social distance is thus very large and the Turkish people demonstrate a rather “reluctant” form of “coexistence”. Another point to note is that supporters of ruling and opposition parties agree on the topics concerned. By contrast to the Turkish people, Syrians think almost the opposite, and do not put such a distance between themselves and the Turks.

Social Distance groups				
	#	%	Points of Social Distance	
Very distant	748	36,1	-0,95	
distant	555	26,8	-0,51	
Neither distant nor close	363	17,5	-0,02	
close	220	10,6	0,44	
Very close	186	9,0	0,88	
General	2.072	100,0	-0,36	
-1,0 / -0,80 Point: Very distant	-0,79 / -0,30 Point: distant	-0,29 / 0,29 Point: Neither distant nor close	0,30 / 0,60 Point: close	0,61 / 1,0 Point Very close

- In spite of the fact that two societies live a life of coexistence, on some matters Turkish society espouse rather negative perceptions merely due to lack of information. For instance, for the 86.2% of the Turkish people who regard Syrians as a burden think that Syrians live only through the assistance of the Turkish state. When Syrians were asked, it has been seen that most of them ensure their sustenance through their salaries from work. It is of vital importance that this information should be accurately shared with the Turkish society in order to eliminate tension. Turkish society tends to think that Syrians obtain financial and material assistance through the taxes they pay, and regards it unfair. Corroborated with the previous observations and findings, SB-2017 as well indicates that between 800000 and 1000000 Syrians provide for themselves and their families through work. For the refugees outside the camps, financial assistance programs provided for the first time with Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN). ESSN is funded by the EU, and outreach is achieved through fieldwork in collaboration with WFP, Turkish Red Crescent and the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. ESSN provides 120 TRY per month for each beneficiary, and as of October 2017 number of beneficiaries reached 1 million. Target of the program is to reach 30% of the refugees, whereas 70% is expected to sustain themselves by their own means. However, we should also consider that financial assistance is an intervention which came too late and this type of assistance pertains the risk of leading people towards laziness during

the process. Nevertheless, the prominent problem here is the feelings of unfairness and uneasiness among the society, mainly stemming from false or deficient information due to shortfalls in communication strategy. Such sort of assistances may lead to further break of bonds between Syrians and Turkish society. It could be more efficient if resources would have been used for more permanent and long-term projects in the regions where Syrians are densely inhabited.

How Syrians in Turkey insure their sustenance? (multiply answer)			
Order No.		#	%
1	By Turkish state's help	1801	86,2
2	By begging	1359	65,1
3	By working	1040	49,8
4	By philanthropists' help	666	31,9
5	By the support of NGOs (association-foundation etc.)	170	8,1
6	By the support of foreign organizations / states	101	4,8
	No idea/no answer	19	0,9

- In the context of SB-2017 study, the Turkish people were inquired “how our society treats Syrians in Turkey?” The Turkish society uttered that there is enormous support and sacrifice by the Turks for the Syrians. 65% part of the society states that the behavior towards Syrians is favorable, whereas 30% contends that Turkish society exhibits negative behavior (i.e. exploitation, humiliation, ill-treatment). It is observed that behavior and emotion patterns are often conflicting.
- SB-2017 study indicates that despite the high level of tolerance/ acceptance, the Turkish society is deeply concerned. The array of answers to the question “how much do you feel the concerns listed below because of Syrians?” suggests indeed a very high rate of concern in all of the answers. Furthermore, the society is deeply divided among themselves about the responses ranging from “help those in need” and “sharing a mutual future” or “embracing coexistence”. Actually by every means Turkish society demonstrates that they are not sympathetic to the idea of sharing a future with Syrians. Strikingly, the concerns are raised more in the regions

neighboring Syria. The deepest concern is about the fear that they will put a strain on the Turkish economy. This is followed by the concerns of increase in crime rate, risk of damage in the cultural structure, and lastly the harm on the society itself. Interestingly, the concern about “Syrians seize our jobs” is not so widespread when compared to other items. There is not a considerable difference among the parties in terms of the degree of concern they raise about Syrians, whereas MHP is the highest among the concerned in all respects.

- In terms of the right of employment of the Syrians, Turkish society’s approach does not permit a clear result to deduce. 54.6% of the Turkish society states that “They certainly should not be allowed to work”, as opposed to 43% who does not object partial or total right of employment be enjoyed by the Syrians. For the past three years, a considerable increase took place in those who support “no work permit for Syrians”, which was 47.4% as found in the 2014 study. Thus, we can point at a rising trend towards concern and disturbance. Granting work permit to the Syrians received more objections from the provinces out of the region (52.7% in the region, 55.1% out of the region), which may be an indicator of acceptance of the current situation in the provinces of the region. Still, it is revealed that the concerns about losing jobs is mounting.

What sort of arrangements should be made regarding the work of Syrians in Turkey?		
	#	%
Definitely should not have working permit	1141	54,6
Temporary working permits for certain jobs	490	23,5
Temporary working permits for all jobs	169	8,1
Permanent working permits for certain jobs	131	6,3
Permanent working permits for all jobs	115	5,5
No idea/no answer	43	2,0
Total	2089	100,0

- One of the most essential findings of the SB-2017 research is the Turkish society’s “reluctant acceptance” on the coexistence with the Syrians. More than 70% of the Turkish society is of the opinion that Syrians will be permanent in Turkey. At the time when the size of the Syrian population in Turkey was 1.6 million, this rate had been 45.1%.

- The responses to the question “whether the Syrians would return to Syria after the end of the war” actually confirm such “reluctant acceptance”. The sum of rates of “none of them would return” and “few would return, however most of them would stay in Turkey” is 70.5%.

Do you think that Syrians in Turkey will go back to their country after war ends?		
	#	%
No one will go back	793	38,0
Part of them will go back but the majority will stay in Turkey	679	32,5
Half of them will go back and the other half will stay in Turkey	238	11,4
The majority would go back and few would stay in Turkey	189	9,0
Almost all of them would go back and few would stay	141	6,7
No idea/no answer	49	2,4
Total	2089	100,0

Where Syrians should live?		
	#	%
They should live in the safe zones in Syria	781	37,4
Only in the camps	587	28,1
They should be all deported	240	11,5
Wherever they want to live in	166	7,9
They should be distributed evenly in Turkey	161	7,7
A Syrians exclusive city should be founded	100	4,8
No idea/no answer	54	2,6
Total	2089	100,0

- Despite the widespread and strong perception/acceptance regarding the permanence of Syrians in Turkey, responses to “where should Syrians live in?” question is alerting with respect to the mutual future of two societies. While 93% of Syrian people live in urban areas with the Turkish people, only 7.9% of Turkish

society took the option “wherever they would like to live with Turkish society”. In addition to this, 7.7% opted for “They should be distributed evenly in the country”. Vast majority of the Turkish people defended exclusionary options such as “They should live in safe zones inside Syria” (%37.4), “They should exclusively be in the camps” (%28.1), “They should all be deported” (%11.5), “a Syrian-exclusive city should be founded” (%4.8). This indicates that 81.8% of the Turkish society is not sympathetic to the idea of coexistence with Syrians.

How much do you agree with the following statements about the results of Syrians living in our country? (%)						
	I do not agree at all	I do not agree	I don't agree and agree at the same time	I agree	I absolutely agree	No idea/ no answer
We can live in peace with Syrians	46,5	28,5	11,8	10,3	1,1	1,8
Syrians would contribute to the Turkish economy	54,1	27,9	8,3	7,4	0,8	1,5
Syrians would enrich the society's culture	52,8	31,8	7,7	5,7	0,5	1,5

- The Turkish society's belief that they could live with Syrians in peace is as low as 11.4%. By contrast, those who espouse the opposing proposition is 75%. In line with that, 84.4% of the people stated that Syrians would not culturally enrich the society, and 82% stated that Syrians would have no contribution to the Turkish economy. These findings indicate that the Turkish society is not ready for a mutual future with Syrians.
- Contrary to the expectations, those who think that accepting Syrians is a way “to demonstrate to the world that we are a strong country” is as low as 48.4%. In other words, the Turkish society is not proud about it.
- The Turkish people state that there is enormous amount of support for Syrians in Turkey, however they are very critical about whether the government took the right course of action. When they were asked “What is your opinion about the Government's policies concerning Syrian migrants?”, rate of those who respond “certainly right” and “right” remains at 18.6%, whereas the 62.4% of the society thinks the policies proved to be wrong, which is indeed a very high rate. Although it is expected of the votes of the opposition parties to be more critical about the

government's policies, the 44.9% of the voters of the ruling AK Parti agrees that the government's policies about the Syrian refugees failed.

- Another topic which the SB-2017 study aims to reveal is the Turkish society's opinion about the legal status of the Syrians in Turkey which includes the matter of conferment of citizenship. Here we first examined the political rights in general, and then moved forwards with the citizenship in specific. When were asked "what sort of regulations should be introduced relating to the political rights of Syrians?", 86.5% of the Turkish society responded that "no rights should be granted". Among the AK Parti supporters those who chose the same item is 77.2%, which is extraordinarily high. In the provinces bordering Syria rate of objectors is higher. These results can be interpreted as Turkish society's resistance and objection to share a future with Syrians.
- 75.8% of the society maintains that "None of the Syrians should be conferred citizenship". Among this group, rate of those who object is higher in the regions neighboring Syria. The sharpest reaction about the conferment of citizenship is shown by the MHP voters by 88.6%. Among the AK Parti voters the same rate is 69%. On the other hand, a group of 21.3% leaves a room for "conditional" conferment of citizenship based on merits such as speaking Turkish, being born in Turkey, having high level of education, being ethnically Turkmen. Ak Parti supporters lead this group. Obviously, the society is not favorable to the conferment of citizenship to Syrians, whereas we can still expect that over time resistance grow weak against the notion that some Syrians be conferred citizenship based on merits, even though there will be no mass conferment of citizenship.

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Order No.		#	%
1	Non should take citizenship	1584	75,8
2	Those who live in Turkey for a certain period should be conferred to citizenship	153	7,3
3	Those who have high education level should be conferred to citizenship	124	5,9
4	Those who born in Turkey should be conferred to citizenship	101	4,8
5	All of them should be conferred to citizenship	84	4,0
6	Turkmens should be conferred to citizenship	63	3,0
7	Those who know Turkish/who learned Turkish should be conferred to citizenship	47	2,2
8	Young people should be conferred to citizenship	11	0,5
	No idea/no answer	61	2,9

- As agreed by all, education aspect is of critical importance in order to prevent lost generations and overcome the potential future threats to the society. However, it is observed that the Turkish society is also reluctant about Syrians receiving education in Turkey. 32.6% of the society maintains that Syrians should only receive Turkish language education, and 25.7% holds that they should receive no education at all. This can be interpreted as an implicit form of objection to the permanence of Syrians in Turkey. The risk that integration policies may promote permanence clearly leads people towards more restrictive lines about providing education services for Syrians. The speculations pertaining to the admission of Syrian youth to Turkish universities further exacerbates the issue. Only 9.5% of the society supported the proposition that “Syrians should have free access to all education services including the higher education.”; and this rate is 12.8% among the AK Parti supporters.
- In terms of the approach of Turkish society towards Syrians in accordance with the parameters such as age, gender, education status, ethnic background and employment status, the differentiation of opinion is at minimal level. Key factors

where differentiation takes place are the region of residence and being a supporter of a particular political party. In almost all survey items, voters of Republican People's Party (CHP) and MHP shared similar opinions and reactions. On the other hand, AK Parti voters diverge from the others in all survey items. The opinions of HDP voters is along the similar lines with those of AK Parti voters. All in all, we need to highlight that differentiation of opinion remains at a limited level in the overall picture. What is worthy of notice is that AK Parti voters as well displayed concern and critical attitude. Another factor in which we could observe differentiation of opinion is about the place of residence, that is, between the provinces neighboring Syria and other provinces. The people who live in the border provinces, who are expected to have more interactions and share more ethnic-religious bonds with the Syrians, distance themselves from them more than the country average.

SB-2017 and Syrians

The SB-2017 research produced following findings relating to the Syrians in Turkey:

provinces							
Order No.		In camps		Outside camps			
				Border provinces		Other provinces	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
1	Şanlıurfa	136	39,1	125	20,0	-	-
2	Hatay	38	10,9	155	24,8	-	-
3	İstanbul	-	-	-	-	170	64,6
4	Gaziantep	43	12,4	120	19,2	-	-
5	Adana	27	7,8	82	13,1	-	-
6	Mardin	68	19,5	35	5,6	-	-
7	Kilis	36	10,3	41	6,6	-	-
8	Mersin	-	-	66	10,6	-	-
9	İzmir	-	-	-	-	52	19,8
10	Bursa	-	-	-	-	41	15,6
Total		348	100,0	624	100,0	263	100,0

- SB-2017 findings as well suggest that there is growing tendency among Syrians towards being permanent in Turkey.
- Average duration of stay of the Syrians refugees in Turkey is more than 3.7 years, beginning from 29 April 2011 to the present. Furthermore, the Syrians are settled and established their new life all across the country at their own will without any directions or regulation by the government. The rate of Syrians who live in camps fell by 6.8%. The tendency of Syrians population in Turkey, size of which exceeded 3.3 million as of October 2017, to stay in Turkey grows stronger since now they are accustomed to live within the Turkish society, and there is little or no possibility that the conflict and destruction in their country would come to an end in the short and medium terms. The number of Syrian births daily is around 306. By the end of

2017, the number of Syrian babies born in Turkey since in 2011 will exceed 305000. More than 1010000 Syrians are currently in school age (5-17). Approximately between 800000 and 1000000 Syrians are estimated to be working in Turkey. Thus, it can be deduced that Syrians establishing their life in Turkey is a routinized notion, which strengthens their permanence in Turkey.

- In SB-2017 research, 38.6% of the participants stated that they are “employed”. Based on this ratio, we can assume that number of Syrians who work in Turkey is between 1.2 and 1.3 million. However, different studies indicate that this number should be between 800000 and 1000000. The fact that women participation in the workforce is very limited in the Syrian population is a factor affecting these calculations.

Working condition in any income-generating job							
Order No.		In camps		Outside camps		General	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
1	Working	314	24,5	1788	43,0	2102	38,6
2	Housewife	303	23,7	1033	24,8	1336	24,5
3	Not Working	319	24,9	755	18,1	1074	19,7
4	Student	273	21,3	365	8,8	638	11,7
5	Disable\Old	57	4,5	185	4,4	242	4,4
6	Retired	5	0,4	36	0,9	41	0,8
	No answer	9	0,7	-	-	9	0,2
Total		1280	100,0	4162	100,0	5442	100,0

* Answers of people who are above 12 years old

- In cases of mass influx, one of the major concerns of the local society is losing their jobs. However, the Syrians in Turkey did not cause a situation supporting this phenomenon after 6.5 years of their presence in Turkey. The number of those who lost their jobs to Syrians is very limited, mainly because of the fact that Syrians are employed in fields where Turkish workers either would not be interested or would not agree to work for such salaries. Although the current state is not sustainable, it effectively contained the social tensions at a low level.

- 43.1% of the Syrians working in Turkey stated that they are employed in daily pay jobs, 40.7% in regular jobs, and 6.2% in seasonal jobs. Moreover, it is observed that Syrians have been integrated into Turkish work life in very short time. In addition to the employees, 9% of the Syrians run their own businesses.

Work that people in the household do							
Order No.		In camps		Outside camps		General	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
1	Daily paid job	120	38,2	785	43,9	905	43,1
2	Regular job	151	48,1	705	39,4	856	40,7
3	Employer	1	0,3	163	9,1	164	7,8
4	Seasonal job	23	7,3	108	6,1	131	6,2
5	Free family worker	15	4,8	9	0,5	24	1,1
6	Work in my own job	3	1,0	18	1,0	21	1,0
	No answer	1	0,3	-	-	1	0,1
Total		314	100,0	1788	100,0	2102	100,0

- Ironically, for the Turkish society who live in the border region, the main concern is not about losing their jobs to Syrians, but rather “losing their husbands” to the Syrians. Many field studies demonstrate that some men of the region put their wives under pressure by the intent of marrying young Syrian women.
- The Syrians mostly live in residential areas in rented apartments (64.4%) despite their limited financial means.
- In terms of their quality of life in Syria, they stated that they were from middle income group in general; 82.7% had their own houses in Syria, 36.6% owned land, 33% owned their workplace, 32.3% had their own car.
- 50.5% of the Syrians stated that they have at least one nuclear family member outside Turkey and Syria.

- Contrary to popular belief, only 30% of the Syrians received assistance from an institution or an individual in the last year. They also noted that often the assistances are not regular. In that case we can deduce that the Syrians ensure their sustenance by their own means through their salaries. Due to salaries being low, more than one person work in each household.

Have you received any institutional or individual assistance in the past year to ensure your family's livelihood?						
	In camps		Outside camps		General	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Yes	187	53,7	195	22,0	382	30,9
No	160	46,0	684	77,1	844	68,3
No answer	1	0,3	8	0,9	9	0,8
Total	348	100,0	887	100,0	1235	100,0

- When surveyed about their access to services and their ability to benefit from services provided for them, the most positive service field for the Syrians seems to be the healthcare by 68.2%. The Syrians in Turkey are very satisfied with the healthcare services in Turkey. Between those who live in and outside the camps, there is not much differentiation in the problematic service, except for the people outside the camps who often face employment-related problems stemming from their work conditions.

How much do you think aids and support that Turkish state gives to Syrians is enough in the following matters? (Points)				
Order No.		In camps	Outside camps	General
1	Health support	72,4	72,9	72,8
2	Educational support	65,6	58,0	60,1
3	A support for a place to stay	55,2	30,6	37,6
4	Food aid	48,6	31,1	36,0
5	Money aid	37,9	28,7	31,3
Average points		55,9	44,3	47,6

 Not enough

 Partly enough

 Enough

- One of the most important findings of the SB-2017 research is that more than half of the Syrians are happy with their life in Turkey despite all the difficulties they face. 21.9% of the Syrians are “not happy at all” or “not happy” with their life in Turkey, whereas 33.7% are either “very happy” or “happy”. When those in the middle between the two feelings (42.3%) are distributed to each side with the same ratio, general feeling leans more to “happy” with a small margin.
- In contrast to the Turkish people who distance themselves from the Syrians, 56.9% of the Syrians perceive Turks as similar to themselves. In that regard, social distance is measured as “close” with 0.52 on a scale between -1 and +1. On the Turkish side, social distance is measured as “distant” with -0.36 which demonstrates striking difference of perspective between two societies.

Do you think that Turks and Syrians are culturally similar?						
	In Camps		Outside Camps		General	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Not similar at all	11	3,2	71	8,0	82	6,6
Not similar	62	17,8	141	15,9	203	16,4
Similar and not similar	52	14,9	140	15,8	192	15,5
Similar	167	48,0	417	47,0	584	47,3
Very similar	31	8,9	87	9,8	118	9,6
No idea/no answer	25	7,2	31	3,5	56	4,6
Total	348	100,0	887	100,0	1235	100,0

- The Syrians who live in the camps clearly state that they are not happy with their life in the camps. Only 23% are happy in the camps, as opposed to the large majority who desire to live outside the camps.

TABLE-82-A: "Overall, how happy you are in your life in Turkey?" (%)							
		Not happy at all	Not happy	Not happy nor happy	Happy	Very happy	No idea/ no answer
Gender							
In Camps	Female	5,1	16,2	47,9	29,9	0,9	-
	Male	2,2	23,4	38,5	31,2	2,2	2,5
Outside Camps	Female	7,9	7,9	54,1	26,5	2,5	1,1
	Male	11,2	12,2	37,2	31,6	4,9	2,9
General	Female	7,1	10,4	52,3	27,5	2,0	0,7
	Male	8,7	15,3	37,5	31,5	4,2	2,8
Age							
In Camps	18-24	3,8	18,5	37,0	40,7	-	-
	25-34	3,5	19,1	40,0	29,6	4,3	3,5
	35-44	3,6	24,5	45,5	25,5	-	0,9
	45-54	1,6	23,8	39,7	34,9	-	-
	55-64	4,5	9,1	50,0	31,8	-	4,6
Outside Camps	18-24	15,8	11,0	40,4	26,7	4,1	2,0
	25-34	8,3	7,0	45,9	31,2	4,5	3,1
	35-44	9,5	14,3	41,0	27,6	4,3	3,3
	45-54	11,0	13,2	39,7	33,1	3,0	-
	55-64	9,0	11,9	41,8	31,3	4,5	1,5
General	18-24	13,9	12,1	39,9	28,9	3,5	1,7
	25-34	7,0	10,3	44,3	30,8	4,4	3,2
	35-44	7,5	17,8	42,5	26,9	2,8	2,5
	45-54	8,0	16,6	39,7	33,7	2,0	-
	55-64	7,9	11,2	43,8	31,5	3,4	2,2
General							
In camps		3,2	21,0	41,7	30,7	1,7	1,7
Outside camps		10,1	10,8	42,5	30,0	4,2	2,4
General		8,2	13,7	42,3	30,2	3,5	2,2
		21,9		21,15 - 21,15	33,7		
		-43,1			-54,8		

- In the survey items, the propositions relating to the coexistence provide important clues to comprehend the current situation and future expectations of the Syrians. SB-2017 research reveals that 68.8% of the Syrians want to be conferred Turkish citizenship, 63.7% are grateful to the Turkish society, and 53.6% stated their desire to stay in Turkey.

TABLE-83: HOW MUCH DO YOU AGREE TO THE FOLLOWING EXPRESSIONS?			
	+	-	
PROPOSITION	I absolutely agree and I agree	I do not agree at all and I do not agree	Difference
Syrians want to get the citizenship	61,5	13,8	47,7
Syrians are thankful to the Turkish society	50,5	16,5	34,0
Syrians do not like Turkish people	23,0	50,6	-27,6
Syrians are excluded in Turkey	22,4	42,9	-20,5
Syrians want to stay in Turkey	31,2	30,2	1,0
Syrians are getting paid in their work	18,1	58,1	-40,0
Syrians are working easily in Turkey	20,6	59,5	-38,9
Syrians want to go to another country	29,0	33,7	-4,7
Turkish people are exploiting Syrians	36,1	24,6	11,5
Syrians are happy in Turkey	30,0	31,5	-1,5

- The aspect which the Syrians complain most about is the unfavorable conditions of work, and that their pay do not correspond to the amount of labor they do. The perception that the Syrians are exploited by the Turks received 54.6% support from the participants. As such, by the Turkish government most of the effort should be directed at the work life aspect in future in order to prevent exploitation of labor and irregular labor market, and at the same time, social tension and loss of jobs for Turkish society.

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- SB-2017 indicates more than 61.7% interest in the Turkish citizenship among the Syrians. This value increases among the male participants who live outside the camps and outside the border provinces.

	I definitely agree & I agree %	I do not agree at all & I do not agree %	Net difference %
General	61,5	13,8	+47,7
In Camps	50,9	17,2	+33,7
Outside camps	65,6	12,4	+53,2

- Among Turkey, the EU, the UN and the Muslim world, the Syrians state that they received most support from Turkey, followed by the EU and the UN respectively. Muslim world ranked lowest.
- Despite of the fact that Turkey is on the top of the list in providing support for Syrians among other countries and international institutions, the Syrians rated Turkey's support 47.6 points out of 100. Healthcare services scored 72.8, education services 60.2 points, which proves to be high.
- Although 3.2 million Syrians comprise 4% of the total population, the Turkish media still did not give comprehensive coverage on the matter. In general current press coverage is rather incident-based and focuses on popular issues, widely avoiding the entire Syrian population similar to the Turkish politics, possibly aims to distance itself from the problems pertaining to the matter. However, this may not be necessarily negative, as the avoidance of the media may have prevented the rise of tensions in the society. When the Syrians who follow Turkish media (15.9%) were asked about the approach of the media towards the Syrians, more of them think that the media coverage is positive.
- When Syrians were inquired about their intentions and conditions of possibility to return to Syria, the 16.3% stated that "they will not return back to Syria under any circumstances". The 12.6% stated that "they will return to Syria if the war ends, regardless of the presence of a government of their choosing". The 2.7% stated that

“they will return to Syria even in case the war does not end.” The vast majority of the Syrians (61.1%) opted for “they will return to Syria if the war ends and a good government would be established.” However, for those who chose the latter, we can say that returning to Syria is not a viable or probable course of action. We have seen that those who live outside the camps, women and 18-24 age group have the least intention to return to Syria. It can be said that 75% of the Syrians are decisive about staying in Turkey onwards.

TABLE-90-A: Which of the following statements about returning to Syria better explains your position? (%)						
		I am not thinking to go back at all	I would go back if war ends and a good regime occurred	I would go back if war ends even if a good regime did not occur	I would go back even if war did not end	No idea/ No answer
Gender						
In Camps	Female	17,1	64,1	10,3	6,0	2,5
	Male	14,3	65,4	12,6	3,0	4,7
Outside camps	Female	16,5	63,1	14,0	1,4	5,0
	Male	16,8	58,1	12,3	2,5	10,3
General	Female	16,7	63,4	12,9	2,8	4,2
	Male	16,1	60,1	12,4	2,6	8,8
Age						
General	18-24	19,7	54,9	18,5	2,3	4,6
	25-34	19,1	59,4	9,8	3,3	8,4
	35-44	10,9	64,1	14,4	2,5	8,1
	45-54	16,1	62,3	9,5	3,5	8,6
	55-64	18,0	62,9	14,6	-	4,5
General						
In camps		15,2	65,0	11,8	4,0	4,0
Outside camps		16,7	59,6	12,9	2,1	8,7
General		16,3	61,1	12,6	2,7	7,3

- The part of the Syrians who does not want to return to Syria (16.7%) were asked the reasons why they would not return, and the 38.3% stated that they were happy in Turkey, the 27.9% stated their wish to become citizens of Turkey.
- On the matter of whether the Syrians want to move to a third country, the findings indicate that 66.9% of the Syrians does not want to settle anywhere other than Turkey, whereas a group of 29.4% of the Syrians in total leave room for moving to elsewhere. The people live in the camps, those belong to 18-24 age group, graduates of elementary school and those live in the border provinces display more tendency to move to a third country. Those who stated they would go to a third country if they had means want to go Germany (26.8%), Canada (16%) and Sweden (10%).
- The legal status of Syrians in Turkey has been debated since their first arrival. When the Syrians of asked about which status they would like to have, the 60.9% asked for double citizenship. The 7.5% stated that “they only want Turkish citizenship”.

In which status you want to be in Turkey?							
Order No.		In Camps		Outside Camps		General	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
1	Double citizenship	144	58,5	376	61,8	520	60,9
2	Refugee status	27	11,0	51	8,4	78	9,1
3	To remain like this	30	12,2	35	5,8	65	7,6
4	Only Turkish citizenship	13	5,3	51	8,4	64	7,5
5	Under temporary protection	14	5,7	44	7,2	58	6,8
6	Long-term/get a permanent residence permit	6	2,4	21	3,5	27	3,2
7	Work permit	7	2,8	13	2,1	20	2,3
	No answer	5	2,1	17	2,8	22	2,6
Total		246	100,0	608	100,0	854	100,0

- When they were asked “Do you believe there is a future for you and your family members in Turkey?”, more than half of the Syrians (50.3%) responded “yes”, which is a meaningful result. An assessment which takes into the account the hopelessness of Syrians about the war and instability in their country, their state of happiness/satisfaction in Turkey, and their approach to the citizenship as a goal would give strong hints about how much their tendency to become permanent in Turkey has been reinforced.

Epilog: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey

As of October 2017, there are over 3.3 million Syrians in Turkey, living overwhelmingly along the border areas but also all across Turkey. Their tendency to remain in Turkey has been irreversibly strengthened. Even if the war in Syria comes to an end in the short term, this sociological reality makes itself felt beyond the expectations of various political plans. This makes it a necessity to think about the future of Turkey's prosperity and well-being and to generate policies that would take into account the high probability that millions of Syrians would stay in the country. The extraordinary sacrifice of Turkish society, as well as the high level of societal acceptance, be it reluctant and fragile, should be made sustainable. To this end, data-based and realist policies, and a comprehensive strategy of process management should be adopted. If the process management fails, Turkish society's great efforts and devotion shown so far will simply be drained away. Possible social, economic, political, and security problems with Syrians should be taken very seriously, as their population will likely to reach up to 5 million within the next decade, considering the fact that they currently make up 4% of Turkey's population, and that there is a natural population increase with 306 Syrian babies born per day. The Syrians Barometer-2017 study clearly highlights Turkish society's rather "reluctant acceptance" with regard to Syrians (in Turkey), points at potential areas of difficulties, and offers suggestions to address pertaining problems. The coherence and integration processes are of a two-way nature, and in this regard, it is not only the Syrians' efforts but also Turkish society's acceptance that will play a decisive role in ensuring social peace for future. We need integration policies that are rights-based and human-based which as well take into account the expectations of Turkish society.

One of the most unique findings of this study relates to the "conscious distance" that the Turkish society has established between themselves and Syrians in Turkey. While the Turkish society do not avoid helping and supporting the Syrians who had to escape war and persecution, Turks quite clearly demonstrated that they are unprepared to share their future with Syrians. The worries and concerns raised by Turkish people should be taken seriously, as it is them who have displayed a legendary case of hospitality and solidarity with more than 3.5 million Syrians and others who have arrived from different countries.

Usually, in the first stages of mass migration, governments of the target countries prefer not to employ integration policies and even tend to resist them. One of the reasons is the risk that integration policies will strengthen the desire to become permanent, and another one is the fear of possible social reactions. However, the risks of not implementing such policies involve a higher cost if the possibility of return is virtually nil. An example of the risk thereof is each single unschooled child becoming a member of the lost generation and posing a risk to the society.

One of the most serious concerns faced by host society at times of mass migration is losing their jobs or suffering a decrease in their wages. The last six and a half years have not posed an example to support such phenomenon taking place in Turkey in real terms. The main reason lies in the fact that Syrians accept to work in areas, under conditions and with wages that are not desirable for average Turkish workers. This is to say that, they are not seen as a threat by the “blue-collar” or “white-collar” Turks. The lack of massive losses of employment in Turkish society proves to be a major reason why social tensions were kept at minimum. Based on the estimates from a limited number of available data and findings, some 800.000-1 million Syrians work to provide for themselves, and thus contribute to the Turkish economy and society. Notwithstanding the short term satisfaction it generated among the Turkish society and economy, this is rather an unsustainable situation in sight of its being legally and morally unacceptable, and may damage the general economic structure of the country in sight of the 35% unregistered workforce. As of November 2017, only 10000 Syrians under temporary protection are employed with work permits. Therefore, the current situation runs great social and economic risks in sight of the exploitation experienced by the Syrians virtually all whom are employed through irregular means.

It is not possible to state that a comprehensive strategy concerning the Syrians in Turkey has been developed in the last 6.5 years. The patience and support of Turkish society, coupled with the extraordinary efforts of bureaucrats in the central and local settings, led to short-term solutions, thereby ensuring the effective response to the problems faced. However, a comprehensive strategy is required in order to ensure sustainability of the process. Such a strategy needs to be based on integration policies, should envisage the mid- and long-term dimensions and be based on reliable data. This strategy should involve a central institutional structure in the form of secretariat-general, presidency or ministry. Considering the scope and complexity of the issue, as well as the strong centralized unitary state structure of Turkey, a ministerial structure specific for the purpose seems to be an ideal solution. One option would be to divide the Ministry of Family and Social Policies into two, and found a new one under the name of Ministry of Social Policies and Integration. After developing a strategy, a communication strategy will be an inherent part of any further advancement. A regular and continuous communication strategy to inform the society would greatly contribute to eliminate negative perceptions concerning Syrians.

Centralized organization is of vital importance for decision and strategy making concerning the Syrians. However, conditions vary among the provinces, and even among the districts within those provinces. After the headquarters in Ankara takes the necessary strategic decisions which outline the general framework of a particular course of action, it would be more effective to delegate the resources and authority to the local settings. As pointed out by the quote “The catastrophe is local”, we need to empower local initiatives, emphasize

coherence, and prevent every single decision to be bound to the approval of Ankara, and to provide local authorities with power and sources.

While the Syrians in Turkey have many complaints, the overall impression is that they are happy in Turkey. That is counted as a success of the Turkish society. However, the trend is strong among educated and skilled Syrians to emigrate to other countries. Turkey needs to put special effort to keep the skilled human capital in the country, and at the same time should focus on not losing the social role-models and key personalities which will help enable the policies of integration. Legal status proves to be a major issue in this context. Syrians are not eligible of the refugee status in Turkey since Turkey retains “geographical limitation” in its ratification of the 1951 Geneva Convention. The removal of this limitation would be a huge developments in terms of refugee rights. However, in face of such huge numbers and the worldwide tendency towards protectionism prevents possible environment for lift geographical limitation. Many countries which do not retain geographical limitation in the Refugee Convention have started to implement de facto limitations. Another alternative to overcome “temporariness” is the citizenship/naturalization. However, this is widely recognized as the ultimate stage of integration processes following a phases of social, economic, and spatial integration; and most importantly, the society should be prepared by the political authority for such a step. “By-passing” these processes, and making citizenship regulations without seeking social acceptance in a *fait accompli* manner certainly leads to reactions. It is possible to observe overwhelming social reaction in Turkey concerning the naturalization of Syrians and the conferment of other political rights. Regulations that would be undertaken despite these social tendencies could also create difficulties for Syrians, and social tensions may escalate into conflicts. Policy-makers should take into account the level of education and skills of Syrians, their conditions of arrival and living, their approach to the Turkish society, and the risk of the ghettoization of this 3.3 million Syrian community in their planning on the matter, seeking of social approval and support.

For planning purposes, one needs to take into consideration the overall education level of Syrians in Turkey, most of whom are originated from Northern Syria, traditionally has been a region with low level of education. Unfortunately, low education level of Syrians compared to the Turkish average increases also the risk of isolating them from the broader society. This also relates to their contribution to the Turkish economy, approach on their children's education, life style preferences characterized by tradition.

A closer look at the regions in which Syrians in Turkey live will show that they are rather stuck in a circle of “solidarity of poverty”. In fact, the worldwide 15%-85% imbalance is also reflected in the Turkish case, even at the micro-level of districts and neighborhoods. The “solidarity in poverty” poses the risk of escalating into conflict easily and quickly if Syrians “newcomers” receive assistance from an external actor. This paradoxical condition is most specifically visible in the case of financial support within the framework of the ESN-project.


The possibility of Syrians' returning to their home has turned into an infinitesimal one. With their country destroyed, and having a rather dim prospect for establishing trust and stability in the future, returns to Syria is at minimum even after successes against certain non-state actors. Not only returning to Syria, but also a relocation policy within Turkey seems rather impossible. As they live in all across Turkey and have established their lives, it is not feasible to settle them to other places without having their consent, with the exception of cases where there are very serious security concerns and if only limited to smaller groups. On the other hand, it is not conscientious or feasible to hold Syrians in camps, in newly founded Syrian exclusive cities or buffer zones which are expectations widely held by the Turkish society in favor of isolating Syrians. One of the rare “positive” developments for the prospects Syrians to integrate in Turkey and maintaining the social acceptance, is about their Turkey-wide presence that emerged as a result of settling Turkish these cities on their own accord.

Today, in 21 camps located in 10 cities some 230 thousand Syrian live, making up only about 7% of overall Syrian population in Turkey. In fact, there is no reason for them to stay in the camps any longer. These camps should be emptied except for some exceptional groups. However, in case the refugees residing in the camps settle down in cities in which these camps are located, it may give rise to new problems, and cause reactions from Turkish society. A better solution could be to assisting 40 thousand families/households which will leave camps with their rental payments for a period of two years and to allow them, as in the case of other 3 million Syrians, to live in cities of their choice. The camps, meanwhile, should be rendered into campuses for public and organized education. It is also time for a realistic regulation with regard to the issue of refugees' mobility, which has been another major issue. It is no longer possible to control the movement 3.7 million people by imposing restrictions of staying in the province of the registration, and asking travel permissions. After this stage, Syrians' migration process within Turkey should become a voluntary one, in line with their own choices. Limitations in this process only affects persons with high qualifications and lead them to leave Turkey.

One of the most important elements of the framework of social coherence with Syrians is related to their inclusion into the decision-making processes. This is of vital importance in order to ensure coexistence under the conditions of coherence and peace. Despite Turkish society and state's extraordinary support for Syrians, the hatred among the Syrian youth and children, be it justified or not, poses a major risk for the future. Promoting Syrians to participate in the process management mechanisms through the formation of student, professional, NGO associations would prevent loss of resources and time, as well as would contribute to the Turkish society.

In this whole process, international solidarity and support are of utmost significance. The financial and technical aid provided to Turkey needs to be increased, and comprehensive cooperation frames should be developed. The international community, primarily the UN and EU institutions, should focus their diligent awareness on the topic. Regardless of the provision of international aid, Turkey needs to develop realistic policies and recognize its sociological reality and pay attention to the Turkish society's concerns for its own peaceful future. The current picture demonstrates that Turks display resistance about sharing their future with Syrians, although they accepted living with the Syrians in a reluctant and concerned manner. Obviously, the desired ideal outcome for Syrians would be their eventual return to their home country and to live a life of safety in peace. Efforts should continue to create the conditions of possibility for returning to Syria in future. Obviously, Turkish society would be contented with such a development. However, a realistic approach holds that a return as such is virtually impossible. As the tendency to stay grows stronger each day, and it would be prudent to consider the costs of an attitude that is based on the assumption that "Syrians will eventually leave." The basic goal here should be to create a peaceful future under the conditions given. Perception of temporariness and being indecisive about the subject would lead to lost generations and irreversible consequences, loss of financial resources and time. Failure in proper management of the process would also lead Turkish society to lose its tolerance, that is, its peace. Such a loss could make go all the sacrifices of the last years in vain. We should not forget that the resilience of Turkish society is the most important resource in this process.

If the set of studies starting with the SB-2017 can make a modest contribution to the process management and policy-making, as well as to a future characterized by justice, dignity, humanity and peace for all, it is indeed the best to expect.



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