After Assad: What Has To Be Done
Fourteen years is quite a long time in both communities’ history and the span of personal lives. Türkiye has generously hosted millions of Syrian refugees since April 2011, in alignment with its international commitments. At its peak, the number of Syrian refugees reached 3,6 million individuals during the 2020s, which made Türkiye the largest refugee hosting country in the world according to UNHCR. Although the numbers started to decline after a couple of years, and is now officially 2,7 million, the lowest figure after the fall of the Assad regime.
With its success and failures, good and bad practices, Türkiye’s recent experience with such a large number of refugees offers valuable lessons for both this country and the international community. This article tries to highlight the lessons to be learned for the future refugee protection policies.
The context:
Between 2011, when the refugee influx started towards all Syria's neighbouring countries, and 8 December 2024, marking the ousting of the Assad regime, there had been important political, economic, ideological and socio-cultural changes in the world, in the region and in Türkiye. What remained constant in Türkiye was the government under the leadership of President (earlier the Prime Minister) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. During his 22 years reign in power, particularly since 2011, the first asylum law, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, entered into force in 2014 together with the first civilian asylum office, the Presidency of Migration Management (originally the Directorate of Migration Management). The drafting process started under the EU pressures in the early 2000’s in an effort to raise Türkiye’s asylum procedures to the EU standards set by Article 24 of the Acquis Comminetaria, in the hope that Türkiye would be a full member of the European Union. The Law was perceived by the EU and UNHCR as a big step forwards but has two deficits: the first was its intention to keep Türkiye’s geographical limitation until 2012, a date of assumed entry to EU; the second was the process in case of a mass influx of refugees, which is in practice, an attempt to take the mass influxes out of the procedural constraints and to give large authority to the executive power. In October 2014, some months after the entry of the Law into force, the Temporary Protection regulation was issued setting the rules for Syrian refugees. Since then, the regulation is in force with minor modifications, in the form of “patch-work” to correct some of the problematic areas arising from the practice.
During the same period, Türkiye experienced the COVID-19 pandemic, a major earthquake severely affecting 11 provinces and parts of Syria. Millions of citizens and refugees were affected by the disaster. Hundreds of thousands were killed and many buildings sheltering millions were damaged. Türkiye went through a constitutional amendment empowering the authority of the president and cutting the power of parliament. During the same years, Türkiye continued its fight against the separatist Kurdish movement both within its borders and across Iraq and northeastern Syria. All these developments, along with the widely criticized economic management has led to severe economic crises but the country has successfully shown resilience and performed economic recovery despite several US and EU sanctions and deteriorated relations with several wealthy Arab nations. The Russian-Ukrainian war added some new burdens on Türkiye though limited, and Israeli aggression in Gazza led to economic losses because of its negative impact on the trade and tourism between these two countries. During these periods of ups and downs, the government’s approach to Syrian refugees has been characterized with zig zags.
Regarding more recent domestic policies, three major developments appear to have important implications in the asylum policies for the near future. The increasing tensions after the so-called 19 March Coup against the mayor of Istanbul, the arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu, on alleged corruption charges put millions of supporters on streets. While the legal proceedings are still at an initial stage, this arrest of the main challenger of Erdoğan’s presidency increases the political polarisation in the country. The internal tensions within the main opposition party, CHP due to the alleged corrupt manipulations at the latest congress would reduce chances of an early election. In case of an early election, the issue of asylum seekers and refugees would revisit the higher levels of the political agenda with the opposition groups resorting to xenophobic rhetoric against the remaining Syrians as a political instrument for electoral gain.
The second development is in terms of President Erdoğan, the “creation of terrorless Türkiye”. The Kurdish separatist group PKK, which continues an armed struggle against Türkiye since 1984, has now dissolved itself and chose to disarm and resort to politics to gain larger political rights of the Kurdish minority. The Government of Türkiye and the PKK’s unofficial political wing, Dem Party, are in the process of testing each other’s goodwill through a series of trust-building gestures. The main opposition party’s position may be described as one of cautiously soft support.
The constitutional amendment proposal is the third development which may hopefully lead to a broader democratic environment through better reinforcing the balance of power, a judicial reform, larger freedoms of the minorities and a more decentralised administrative system. If not ruined by the political parties from both in power and in opposition, this process would create a liberal political atmosphere, where strong Turkish nationalism, xenophobia and the traditional attitude of blaming ‘imperialism’ for all failures would be politically less attractive. In such a process, the chances of lobbying for the rights of foreigners, mainly asylum seekers who need international protection would increase. A more pessimistic expectation however is that this process aims to further consolidate President Erdoğan’s one party authoritarianism.
14-year-long Temporary Protection… (tendencies)
The presence of a large number of refugees in Türkiye for a protracted period caused millions of refugees trapped in a condition of without strong status, without solutions, and without a future. The threat of being deported back to their country of origin has been hanging like the sword of Damocles over refugees’ heads. Severe discrimination, hate speech, violent attacks, economic exploitation, segregation, selected arbitrary forced deportation, in human pushbacks from the neighbouring countries, obstacles of accessing to justice, lack of shelter and social attitude not to offer a house for rent, restrictions/bans of the freedom of movement, are among the bad experiences that millions of refugees were exposed.
The need for international protection:
By June 2025, the Government of Türkiye announced the number of voluntary returns as 273,000 people. The Community Pulse Survey, a UNHCR led Inter-Agency assessment conducted in February 2025, found that 58% of respondents stated they did not intend to return to Syria. An additional 12% are considering returning one day, 10% intend to return within the next 12 months, 8% within the next five years, 11% remain undecided, and 1% prefer not to respond.
Nearly 48% of respondents felt they lack sufficient information to make informed decisions about returning to Syria, with the most requested information being safety and security updates (77%), housing and property rights (62%), and economic opportunities in Syria (52%).
Regarding support needs in Syria, respondents prioritized financial assistance (76%), healthcare access (39%), and help in securing livelihoods in Syria (36%).
Another and more recent report (April to June) conducted by Upinion supports UNHCR’s finding the lack of information particularly on safety and security. 95% (n=201) of respondents that were still in Türkiye indicated that they had not travelled to Syria since the fall of the Assad regime, with 37% of those planning future visits. In June, Upinion observed that 14% (n=128) had undertaken a "go-and-see" visit to Syria (the PMM states that 75,000 persons undertook a ‘go-and-see’ visit to Syria).
From refugee protection to migration management
Despite Türkiye’s failures of comprehensive integration policies, the findings of the surveys explain that not only the ongoing safety and security concerns of Syrian refugees in Türkiye but also their limited well-being play a role to prefer to stay longer in Türkiye.
The last 14 years helped the people of Türkiye and the Syrian refugees to know each other better with all their positive and negative aspects. Syrian refugees were not forced to live in ‘Indian reservations’ type of camp enclaves. They spread all across 81 provinces and mostly concentrated in Türkiye’s most industrialized cities largely without residence permits there. Such an informal presence in cities outside the registration zones, limits their access to basic services like education and health. The majority of refugees, mostly living out of their registration cities, still enjoy, though expensive, utilities like water supply, electricity, heating gas or coal, internet and public transport. In time some were able to run their own markets, workshops, transportation companies similar to the Uber taxi services, Holly Quran reading courses, etc. The returnee families in interviews in front of the provisional Migration Management Directorates in cities, where they approach for processing their applications said they were very grateful to Türkiye and the Turkish people for their hospitality. Despite the politically motivated xenophobic attitudes, limited social and cultural proximity between the Turkish and Syrians has been established; although limited, common communication channels are working. Also despite the fear of being deported and social exclusion amounting to peer pressures, street violence and other forms of humiliations, Syrians have been living in a much freer community compared to the totalitarian regime under Assad in Syria. At least they lived free from the “Muhaberat’s (Syrian Intelligence service) watch”.
The International Law and Turkish Law
Currently, both the International Refugee Law and the national asylum legislation obliges Türkiye to host refugees as long as the threats against their lives and liberties continue to exist in their country of origin. But once such threats disappear, it may become the right of the host countries to lift the international protection they provide for refugees.
The Article 1 /C / 1, 2, 3, 4 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees states that “This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A if: He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country; or Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it; or He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality; or He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution.
Article 1 /C/ 5 is also crucial regarding the Syrian refugees in Türkiye on how their refugee status (the Temporary Protection Status) shall cease even if they are not willing to return to Syria unless that the conditions that had made them refugees once, are not fulfilled any more. The Article 1 / C / 5 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees states that “This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A / C 1, 2, 3, 4)… (or); He can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A(1) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of nationality; or..”
When applied to the Syrian refugees in Türkiye, this means that with the exception of the prevalence of the risks to their safety and security and in case the refugee is able to invoke the compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution (or lack of safety) for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of nationality…, it is not only the free choice of a refugee to stay or to return when the ground of persecution (or insecurity) is no longer exists, counts. The host country may legally lift the international protection (refugee status) under such conditions.
The Temporary Protection Regulation of Türkiye (revised on 25/12/2019 and no. 30989) also sets conditions of when and how the Temporary Protection would cease to exist. Article 4 of the Law commits Türkiye to the principle of non-refoulement as described in the Article 33 of the 1951 refugee convention.
The most favoured-national treatment vs refugee status
Both the above mentioned UNHCR and Upinion research as well as some other surveys indicate that a substantial number of refugees would stay in Türkiye for a while. However, it seems inevitable that in time economic, financial and social factors will gradually take precedence over the safety and security concerns for the return if the reconstruction process in Syria progresses smoothly. This would reflect Syrian citizens in Türkiye less in “refugee” like status and more in “economic migrants” situations.
While the economic, financial and cultural concerns gain priority for the Syrians, who prefer to stay in Türkiye over the security and safety concerns, new legal arrangements outside of any international refugee protection schemes, will be necessitated to justify their stay under some preferential arrangements (as discussed in Article 1 / C / 5 of the 1951 Convention).
Such measures will also be in need of not only those Syrians who preferred to live in Türkiye but also because of the potential economic cooperation between the two countries. Türkiye being a middle-income country with its relatively advanced industry, offers potential livelihood and job opportunities with higher salaries for Syrians in Syria. Above all, since the Syrian revolution in December 2024, the Government of Türkiye has worked very closely with the new Syrian regime for the reconstruction of Syria. It is logical to assume that economic and social ties between the Turkish and Syrian people will be further deepened. It seems a high possibility that the borders between the two countries would once again become an open one, not for refugee crossings but population movements for a variety of reasons such as education, trade, labour, health, tourism, family visits, property acquaintance etc.
Furthermore, a stable Syrian territory would become an attraction for the Turkish business community to invest in Syria.
Bilateral agreements between Ankara and Damascus will therefore be unavoidable for the economic cooperation potentialities between the two countries. They are also necessary for Syrians who prefer to stay longer in Türkiye. As in case between some groups of European countries such as the Benelux countries, the Scandinavian and EU countries or NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) countries, there will be a need for signing preferential agreements between Türkiye and Syria for mutual protection of reciprocal rights of their citizens in areas of education, labour, long term residency, financial, commercial and working rights.
The recent statement by the Turkish Minister of Interior, Mr. Ali Yerlikaya indicates that things have already started to evolve towards this direction. The Minister in a recent meeting with some SCOs in Ankara reportedly said that visa types from Syria to Turkey would soon be expanded, with entry procedures being facilitated. He added that the Government of Türkiye aspires to open border crossings with Syria without a visa, and even without a passport, as was the case before 2011. Yerlikaya also said that the government would pressure the Turkish companies to ensure social security and pension rights of the Syrian employers. The Minister’s statement followed by a new official announcement of a set of measures aiming toward free movement of people between Türkiye and Syria.
